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This chapter focuses on young people’s narratives in constructing their sense 
of identities with their country, and how these are used to distinguish 
themselves as a generation distinct from their parents and grandparents. The 
study is of 13 to 19 year olds in twelve European countries that were 
formerly in the communist bloc, and have since joined (or are joining) the 
European Union. Their discussions of the meanings their country had for 
them raise questions about their use of political discourse, their expressions 
of feelings of patriotism, and their sense of agency in their own and their 
county’s future. These are analyzed through Bruter’s (2005) lens of civic and 
cultural engagement with a country, and the relationship between 
generational shifts in political identity and historical transitions in society 
suggested by Fulbook (2011).  
 
This chapter analyses how some young people in post-communist Europe 
construct narratives of identity with their country, their sense of agency, and their 
constructions of themselves as generationally different from their parents and 
grandparents. Based on data from focus groups with young people between 12 and 19 
from twelve countries which joined the European Union in 2004-13, I argue that 
many of these young people demonstrate a sophisticated ability to construct a range of 
narratives with their country and with the European Union that show a complex and 
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contingent pattern of identities. They talk about politics, their political self and 
agency, and of belonging to various geo-political entities such as the nation/country 
and the European Union.  
  These twelve countries both have elements in common and some significant 
differences in their political histories. Some of them were new, or newly independent, 
following the break up of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), or of 
Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia [in the process of joining the European 
Union]), or of Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic and Slovakia); others had been 
countries under Soviet hegemony (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia itself). None of these states existed in their present boundaries in 
1914; all had been devastated by the 1939-45 war; and all had experienced various 
forms of authoritarian repression between 1945 and 1989.  
The teenagers whose constructions are analyzed in this study were all, 
therefore, members of the first generation born after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This is not to homogenize the histories of all these 
countries, each had its own particular trajectory, but in each the construction of a 
political narrative of the state in which these young people live is being carried out 
under very different circumstances to those of their parents or grandparents when they 
were young. These young people have no direct experiences of the regimes, wars, 
uprisings and assertions of independence with which many of their parents and 
grandparents were involved.  
Leccardi and Feixa (2012) have suggested that young people in Eastern 
Europe are more tied to the memories of the family than are young people in Western 
Europe. They argue that their prolonged and necessary cohabitation with their parents 
means that they continue to be brought up within the remnants of the post-communist 
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context of their family life, they “have to come to grips on a daily basis with the 
legacy of the former Soviet-style socialism” (Leccardi and Feixa 2012, 5). Such a 
hypothesis is not borne out by the evidence of the young people in this study (see also 
Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon 2010, Macek et al. 1998). More compelling is the 
argument put forward by Fulbrook (2011), whose study of German identities in the 
20th century suggests that there are not only significant differences in the ways that 
identities are constructed between generations, but that these are the consequence of 
political fractures and dissonance in national society. Fulbrook (2011) argues that the 
age at which people experience key historical moments, such as the transitions within 
German society in 1933, 1945 and 1989, can be a critical explanatory factor behind an 
individual or group’s ‘availability for mobilization’ for political expression. This 
“construction of a collective identity on the basis of generationally defined common 
experiences” (2011, 11) is used to explain the rise of National Socialism and the post-
war politics of the Germanys. Age, she suggests, is “crucial at times of transition, with 
respect to the ways in which people can become involved in new regimes and 
societies” (2011, 488). 
Identification with a geo-political institution – such as a state or the European 
Union - is multidimensional. Bruter (2005) suggests two major components of 
identity with a political community:  
A cultural perspective would analyze political identities as the sense of 
belonging an individual citizen feels towards a particular political group. This 
group can be perceived by him [sic] to be defined by a certain culture, social 
similarities, values, religion, ethics or even ethnicity…  
A civic perspective would see… the identification of citizens with a civic 
structure, such as the State, which can be defined as the set of institutions, 
rights, and rules that preside over the political life of the community.  
(Bruter 2005, 12) 
Bruter was writing specifically with reference to the development of a 
‘European identity’, but his model also holds with respect to the construction of state 
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or national identities. He contends that these two components exist in parallel in 
citizens’ minds, and need to be differentiated when possible. For example, individuals 
may have stronger civic or cultural elements to their (European) identity, with 
differences between individuals, countries, and over periods of time. Using a 
questionnaire with UK, French and Netherlands respondents (n=212) he offers 
evidence of “a civic component… [that] makes people identify with the European 
Union as significant ‘superstate’ identity, and … a cultural component that makes 
people identify with Europe in general as an area of shared civilization and heritage” 
(2005, 114). He speculates that a common European heritage might be too much of 
abstraction, and supports this with focus group data from the same three countries: 
“civic unity is a major determinant of the level of European identity of citizens” 
(2005, 162).  
This differentiation of cultural and civic references is core to the analysis of 
young people which follows, in how they identify both with Europe and their country. 
It will become evident that the competing poles of the cultural and the civic jockey for 
position contingently and temporally in the ways that young people construct and use 
their identities.   Their identification with each of these employs aspects of these two 
components in varying degrees, depending on the particular moment and the 
particular focus of discussion. What political discourses do they utilize in constructing 
their identities as members of a country that is so different to the nation of their 
parents’ youth? How do they respond to these constructions – do they feel empowered 
to actively engage in social and political affairs, or do they feel that they lack agency 
and alienated from the political? Do they construct themselves politically as different: 
has there been a generational shift?  
 
Commented [ZM1]: Check sentence. 
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Young people’s political discourse 
Political discourse is sometimes presumed to be solely the domain of the 
politician, but van Dijk (1997) argues we “should also include the various recipients 
in political communicative events … once we locate politics and its discourses in the 
public sphere, many more participants in political communication appear on the 
stage” (van Dijk 1997, 13). Deliberation, decision and action are defining political 
activities, and politics is about discourse in the context of disagreement, conflicts and 
of inequalities in power (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). In this chapter I argue that 
young people are not simply recipients of political communications, but actively 
debate and internalize such discourse, and use it to contribute to the construction of 
their own political and social identities. 
Many studies of political socialization have cast young people as passive 
recipients of political messages from the social environment (eg Hahn 1998). The 
attitudes of teachers and education policy makers towards dealing with political and 
social controversies in school may be critical: teacher and institutional resistance to 
the controversial may be part of a denial that young people can understand or have an 
interest in the political (Maitles 1997). Qualitative studies that seek out political 
understanding suggest that there is more taking place. As Coles (1968), a psychiatrist 
reviewing his transcripts of 25 years, explains: 
we have found ourselves surprised by our chronic inability even to recognize 
the political implications of what we were hearing from children …We have 
tried to understand why it took us so long… to regard our data… as a sort of 
running political commentary by boys and girls who were… involved in 
dramatic moments in history. 
(Coles 1986, 8-9) 
 
Furnham and Stacey (1991, 33) point out that most research on political 
socialization regards young people as “passive interpreters of the political information 
that they receive”. However, they also point out that young people seek political 
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information, and sometimes reject it, selecting and changing it to fit their own 
interpretive framework. Thomas’s (2009) study of children and young people’s 
political participation argues that many studies over the past two decades have 
focused on adult-led activities, in which children’s spaces and autonomy have been 
restricted. What is needed, he claims, are studies of children as political actors and of 
the micro-politics of children’s interactions with each other and with adults. But 
Alderson (2010) has pointed to Thomas’s (and others) tendency to focus on small 
empirical personal micro-communication studies that exclude and disadvantage 
children making only fairly brief references to political context, and consequently 
politics remains a “crucially neglected topic in childhood studies” (2010, 429). 
In the field of political geography, Philo and Smith (2003) suggest that there 
is a common disregard for young people’s conceptions of geo-political spaces (such 
as countries), and that this is a consequence of young people’s limited availability to 
directly influence the more obvious ‘political’ phenomenon and structures that are to 
do with nation and states. Skelton (2008, 26) attempts to addresses this omission in 
her conceptualization of young people as “agentic in making their own socio-spatial 
worlds”. She argues that because they are part of our social structures, we “need to 
capture their commentaries on the social world around them” (2008, 26). She 
elsewhere develops this argument: the very fact that their position is “liminal … 
within political-legal structures and institutional practices … makes them extremely 
interesting political subjects” (Skelton 2010, 146). This chapter will offer some 
examples of young people offering critical commentaries on their relevant political 
practices and structures, as they construct their identities within various available geo-
political spaces.   
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Jens (2004) observes that young people are “strikingly sensitive about global 
social themes like the environment and peace. Again, this chapter offers a range of 
empirical evidence in support.  But Jens also notes that society mainly plays upon this 
sensitivity and these observations in a limited educative manner. This sensibility of 
children is mainly considered as a “solid base for future citizenship and only rarely as 
a base for actual citizenship” (2004, 31). In this present study, it was notable how 
often young people said that they would not, or could not, talk about these issues in an 
educational setting.  
Kallio, analyzing largely data from children younger than those considered in 
this chapter, offers a definition of children’s politics as “intentional social activity 
which has particular meaning to its performer” (Kallio 2009, 8). She argues that 
children’s empowerment and agency is situational, a tactical use of opportunities to 
“momentarily …politicize an issue important to them” (Kallio 2008, 12). Katz argues 
that such agency needs to be more widely recognized: “children are not just 
repositories of adults’ desires and fantasies, but also subjects and social actors in their 
own rights” (Katz 2008 9; also Habashi 2009). The data analyzed in this study 
evidences the active engagement of many young people with social and political 
ideas, and their recognition that they have decisions to make and options to choose 
that are not simply personal choices, but ones that impact on and interact with their 
societies. They have agency, and they are very aware of this. Kallio and Häkli (2011) 
have identified and criticized what they see as the two major current research streams. 
There are those that focus on children’s agency and role in local and national policy 
(such as Thomas and Skelton) – but although these seek to empower children’s voices 
in the public agenda, they also determine and constrain this agenda and thus exclude 
some young people by requiring specific forms of political action (Kallio and Häkli  
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2011:22-23). Secondly, there is a research stream that address children’s everyday 
lives in relation to political issues relevant to particular young people, that may be, for 
example, economy or war (for example, Katz and Habashi) – but such a research 
agenda excludes the voices of those who are not activists or involved in conflicts (23).  
What I attempt in this analysis is to offer these particular young people – most of 
whom are not activists, or involved in conflicts as their parents may have been - an 
opportunity “to be taken seriously, to engage in dialogue with adults and each other, 
and to have an appropriate degree of autonomy” (Thomas 2010, 188) and to use the 
outcome to allow them to create their own agenda for constructing their relationships 
to their countries or larger geopolitical regions 
 
This study 
The chapter is based on a one-person study I made, with the assistance and 
support of a great many people in these countries and the UK, for which I am 
gratefuli. I worked with young people between 11 and 19 years old, in fifteen different 
countries in Europe [the whole study also included countries that are candidates for 
joining the European Union – Turkey, Iceland and Macedonia, and Cyprus] (Ross 
2015). I carried out focus groups in several locations in each country between January 
2010 and October 2012, visiting cities and towns in which I had colleagues willing to 
assist me. In each location in each country I usually visited two schools, trying to 
select those with different socio-economic intakes: this was the most efficient way to 
access groups of approximately the same age. In each school there were two groups of 
approximately six students. My aim was to include young residents of each country, 
not necessarily citizens, and I tried to include some young people from significant 
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minority groups. Table 1 shows the numbers of locations, schools, focus groups and 
students in the study. 
[TABLE 1 here] 
 This was not a representative sample of young people, but a convenience 
sample of the range of potential views across each country: from different regions 
within the country, different social backgrounds and different cultural groups. 
Consent was obtained from the schools, parents and the young people themselves, and 
all data has been made anonymous. Most interviews were in English: where the young 
peoples were not able to do this a native-speaking colleague translated (an academic 
acquainted with issues of citizenship and identity who was not known to the young 
people). In the English-language interviews this colleague supported the young people 
when needed. Discussions were transcribed and examined and systematically 
analyzed against a country-specific index of themes built partly on the Bruter and 
Fulbrook studies (above), partly on country-specific literature, and partly on the 
groups’ specific narratives. These country-analyses were then combined into a meta-
analysis (Rabiee 2004, 657).  
Identities are open to change, because their origin lies in communal 
exchanges. They are constantly reconstituted through shared understandings and 
discursive explorations with others (Shotter and Gergen, 1989; Burr 1995). This 
chapter explores some of the discursive practices employed in young people’s talk 
about identity. Burr observes that “our ways of understanding the world come not 
from objective reality but from people, both past and present” (Burr 1996, 7). The 
young people in these groups negotiate meanings between themselves using their 
previous social experiences, each other’s observation, and my questions and probing. 
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I used focus group discussions to allow participants to collaboratively 
construct their views and position themselves in discourses, and as my principal data 
source (Krueger and Casey 2009). These were not a series of semi-structured 
interviews, but discussions between members into which I introduced issues on which 
to focus (Hess 2009). I phrased to indicate that I did not know what the answer might 
be. I acted as a naïve foreigner asking for explanations of the self-evident. My 
participation kept conversations flowing with requests for clarification and 
occasionally drawing out apparent contradictions or changes in a participant’s 
position. I did not intend to challenge points of views, but rather was aiming to elicit 
more conversations.  
My opening questions were designed to put everyone at ease: I accepted all 
responses as valid, welcome and useful, and ensured that everyone spoke. I then 
focused on aspects of location: were they all from the same country? Those from 
other countries were asked how they felt about their country of origin and their 
country of residence. I spoke of ‘the country’, not of the state or the nation. I 
sometimes contrasted answers from different people to prompt debate. Asking how 
the young people thought their parents and grandparents thought about these issues 
allowed the opportunity to compare themselves with earlier generations. Some 
responded literally about their own families, others talked more generally about older 
people. I invited comments on social and regional differences, and possible 
minorities.  
The contexts of these discussions inevitably affected their nature and content. 
Each focus group was heterogeneous and served as an audience for itself and for a 
stranger, enacting a specific and unique set of identities through the discourses 
invoked. The data generated in this project is the consequence of particularities that 
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are partially a reaction to the insertion of my identity(ies) (or what the group members 
constructed as my identities) into the group. It is their retort both to that act and to the 
expressed identities of the other group members. By working with several groups 
(within schools, locations, and countries) I have attempted to crystallize my data 
through multiple reflections or iterations, but I, as the interlocutor in each situation, 
remained the same (but not necessarily constant) participant. Examining the social 
construction of identities can only be attempted in a social context, and social contexts 
cannot be reproduced (Shotter 1990). The counterpoint to this is that it now becomes 
my subjectivities that seek to interpret the ‘meaning’ of their discourses. Having taken 
up a particular position as my own, I inevitably see the world from the vantage point 
of that particular position, in terms of the particular images and metaphors relevant 
within particular discursive practices (Davies and Harré 1990). 
As mentioned earlier, the discourses were systematically analyzed against a 
country-specific index of themes built partly on the Bruter and Fulbrook studies 
(above), on examples of expressions of feelings of agency, or lack of this (Katz 2008), 
and partly on country-specific literature. 
 
Constructions of the nation 
One very common expression of national identity was reference to pride in 
the history and cultural practices that were thought to be unique to the country. 
Several young people referred to how they had become aware of having a particular 
culture. A Czech young woman, Milenka (♀14) described making a study visit to 
Denmark:  “it was the moment when I discovered what it was to be Czech … only 
then did I realize what it meant to me, to be Czech, to have traditions.” Cultural 
specifics were often seen as the significant differentiators between European 
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countries: Olesia from Kraków (♀12) said  “we are not different when you think 
about rights, but we are different if you think about culture. We have different music, 
different songs … [our] own language.”  Rostek (16♂) in Warszawa linked Polish 
culture to the motto Bóg, Honor, Ojczyzna [God, honor and fatherland] -  “many 
people identify themselves with these values”, going on to argue that while the current 
liberalization in Poland seemed to diminish Poland’s historical experience “we should 
find a centre between these two different visions”. In Presov (Slovakia) a group of 12 
year olds competed to list attributes: “dances”, “handcrafts”, “cooking - national 
dishes and food”, “language - all Slovaks have language in common”.  
Others cited national literature and music, writers and composers as evidence 
of their culture, and spoke with detail and verve about their distinctive contribution, 
often linking this to the development of nineteenth century romantic nationalism. 
These positive cultural markers were strongly foregrounded in most of the discourses 
about why they identified with the country, and there were, in the conversations about 
the country per se very few references to civic institutions such as parliament, 
presidents or flags.    
There were a significant number of expressions of internationalism, of a 
desire to make as little as possible national differences. In Poland, Patrycja (♀18) 
argued, “now for young people [it] isn’t so important that we are Polish - we’d rather 
say that we are western European Union”. Tomasz (♂17) described himself as “a 
citizen of the world, not just of Europe, but of the world.” But some saw these 
changes as a threat, globalization potentially attacking the country’s distinctive 
values. In Białystok, Ida (♀18) reflected “we have a great culture, and we are proud 
of it - but nowadays … we maybe don’t have much difference between many 
countries.”  
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References to the country’s politicians were nearly always negative. In the 
Baltic states they were seen as argumentative and not competent: Hillar (♂16) said 
“they fight each other. They don’t agree on important decisions - they are like 
children [laughter]. Always fighting …Estonian politicians seem to be a bit stupid”. A 
common theme in many countries was that politicians were self-seeking and sought to 
personally benefit from office. This was seen as endemic in Slovakia by Bohuslav 
(♂14) as he argued, “if you go to other countries everything is clean, and [here] the 
politicians grab everything… we have nothing, everything is corrupt”. Such a 
perception was found in many countries - their own national politicians were thought 
to be more venal than those of other countries.  In Bulgaria, Todor (14♂) claimed 
politicians “lie to people [to get elected] …they care only for themselves when they 
get power”.  
Many young people were critical of their compatriots, particularly about the 
way that they engaged in civic activities. For example, Małgorzata (♀ 16) pointed out 
that though many Poles disliked the government, “they don’t bother to go to the 
elections to do anything about it. Poles are passive about politicians’ activities”. There 
were similar charges of electoral apathy in Bulgaria. In a heated discussion, Nikola 
(♂16) said “in some countries when the Government makes a change which is not 
liked by the people - they stand up and protest about that change …but whatever our 
government changes, we just say ‘OK’ … ‘Oh, it doesn’t matter’. I think we should 
stand up and fight for our rights”.  
In the former Yugoslav states and Bulgaria in particular some young people 
tended to describe their position as liminal on the threshold of Europe, but not within 
it. This was sometimes expressed in spatial terms referring to Europe as situated to the 
North-West and the Balkans to the South-East, themselves on the border. At other 
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times liminality was related to temporality, such as the phrase ‘not yet European’ was 
used quite often – it was a condition yet to be achieved. 
This negative portrayal of civic leaders of the country in relation to 
politicians, and to the political behavior of some citizens was strikingly different from 
the stress on cultural affiliations that were so prominent in the great majority of the 
focus groups. Bruter’s (2005) civic-cultural perspectives seem to be an appropriate 
analytic framework to characterize constructions of identification with the country 
(the ‘nation’ being rarely referred to). There was a strong and positive stress on 
culture, history, language and traditions as features of their affiliation with the 
country, and a much more negative portrayal of the country’s civic institutions, a 
striking reversal of the way in which Bruter described European identities.   
However, when the focus group moved on to discuss the potential for also 
having a European identity, Bruter’s analysis was confirmed. A European Union 
identity was strongly linked to the institutions and civic practices of the Union 
(mobility, schemes for study opportunities, economic support through trade and 
regional support, and the promotion of human rights), and the possibilities of a 
cultural identity across Europe were generally dismissed (see Ross 2015 for a more 
extensive analysis of this). But when the focus groups moved on to discuss the 
hypothetical enlargement of the European Union to include countries, such as Belarus 
or Russia, then many young people objected strongly on the grounds of what they 
perceived as a lack of democracy and respect for human rights in those states – and at 
this point, contrasting them with the civic virtues of their own countries.  To give 
some brief examples of this: in Estonia, Imre (♂15) referred to Russia as “not a very 
democratic country … [here we ] make sure that human rights are protected”, and in 
Poland Onufrius (♂15) said Russia was “deep in communist times - they have fewer 
15 
 
rights and freedoms than in Europe.” In South-East Europe attitudes to Russian 
membership varied. Bulgaria and Serbia historically had strong positive connections 
with Russia, and the view that Russia was a champion or protector of the Serbs 
colored the views of the Slovenians and Croatians against Russian. In Romania 
Cristian (♂16), having denounced his country’s political institution as corrupt, then 
contrasted it with Russia stated: “we try to be sort of politically correct here, and they 
don’t really - they have … a history, a habit, of exploiting underdeveloped countries.” 
Viewing the possibility of other states as potential partners threw up different 
orientations of their own country. Othering states with a different political order, with 
different civic cultures and values, led them to see their own countries in a somewhat 
different light. When asked to consider their own country in isolation, it was 
constructed in cultural terms, and the country’s political institutions were downplayed 
- sometimes with savage criticism. When filtered through the lens of potential 
partnership with some other states, their own country became constructed as political, 
and civic virtues were paraded to demonstrate difference.  Both of Bruter’s (2005) 
perspectives, the civic and the cultural are used contingently as the conversations 
move between the use of different lenses. 
 
Constructing a generational narrative  
As discussions progressed from initial protestations of familial affection and 
continuity, a sense emerged that participants’ identities were different from those of 
their parents and grandparents. Most young people described parental views as rooted 
in past history, which helped explain their parents’ identities and preoccupations but 
were not considered as very relevant to their own identities, their present or futures. 
The discussion by a group in Warszawa (Warsaw) that follows illustrates this. 
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In April 2010 Russia invited a delegation of Polish politicians and military 
leaders to a memorial for the Katyn massacre of 1940. The airplane taking the Polish 
president and others crashed as it landed, and all 96 on board died. Polish society was 
devastated, and a memorial cross was erected outside the Presidential palace in 
Warszawa. When the president asked for this to be moved to emphasize the separation 
of state and church, there were protests from the ‘defenders of the cross’. There were 
clashes with the police and then with the young supporters of a counter-movement 
who argued that Poland was secular (BBC 2010; Leszczynski 2011).  
In November 2010, I spoke with a group of 15 and 16 year olds in a central 
Warszawa Gimnazjum (high school) a couple of kilometers from the Presidential 
Palace:  
Lech … I think that there’s false patriotism in Poland, a false concern with 
politics - however, if a nation unites during catastrophes, like the 
Smolensk catastrophe, when one could sense an explosion of 
Polishness, and for a moment the nation unites, and the arguments 
don’t matter for a moment, for a while - show-off patriotism. I have 
never met a real patriot... The majority of my friends and people I 
know aren’t, because we don’t have major national problems, national 
issues. My friends are not concerned with national identity … The 
older generation from the times of communism, when Poland was not 
wholly independent - back then this was necessary to free Poland - 
now, we don’t have this problem….  
Sergiusz There’s a huge difference between the older and the younger 
generations. The patriotism of older people has developed into egoism. 
This is changing, but we can still see this in small towns - and the 
patriotism of older people isn’t a good patriotism. We can say that 
older people feel like Poles, but younger people feel less citizens of 
Poland and more citizens of Europe. They are more like Europeans, 
they are more open to other people from different countries. 
Kinga The younger generation doesn’t care if it’s Polish or something else - it 
doesn’t feel a bond with the nation. The older people who fought for 
our independence feel more strongly the statement ‘I am a Pole’… 
When they put the cross before the presidential palace, the older 
generation was very pro putting a monument there, to commemorate 
the deaths, and they wanted the accident to be remembered, and the 
younger generation just stood there for fun, just to watch the whole 
cross affair, and to see these people.  
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Lech begins by talking of “false patriotism”, and then concedes there could 
be moments of national catastrophe, such as the Smolensk crash, that created feelings 
of national unity. But the younger generation was not patriotic, he argued, and did not 
need to be. Echoing Fulbrook (2011), he argued that “the older generation from the 
time of communism” justifiably needed to be patriots “to save Poland”, and that 
“they” thought it should not be forgotten. He articulated an opposing discourse with 
“friends and people that I know” that disagreed with the views of his parents. Sergiusz 
picked up also intergenerational differences. Older people were egotistical, 
conservative, and did not show “good” patriotism. Younger people were less Polish 
and more European. Kinga supports this with her analysis of how the different 
generations behaved in the affair of the cross.  
Many young people saw their parents and grandparents as locked into a view 
of the country that was conditioned by histories of struggle and resistance that were 
no longer so relevant. Parents and grandparents were described, fairly consistently, as 
being more patriotic and as having a greater attachment to the country than their own 
generation. These young people were not generally disrespectful of their parents’ 
position, but argued that conditions now were different for themselves and for their 
futures. Given the lens of generational change, their constructions of their country 
seemed to shift. They defined the differences between their views and their parents’ 
views of the country less in terms of cultural identification, and more in terms of 
historical perceptions of the changes in the nation and national identity. 
In the various narratives I collected, the construction of difference from the 
older generations was striking, sometimes almost with a sense of loss: “now we don’t 
feel the necessity of solidarity so much,” explained Jolánka (♀15) in Hungary. 
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Gosia’s (♀17) account is full of references to grandparents and parents positioning 
them in a binary of ‘they’ and her own generation as ‘we’:  
maybe not our parents, but our grandparents feel the most Polish, because they 
or their parents were fighting for Poland in the wars … my grandma and my 
grandfather … tell me about the wars and how they lived - how it was hard, 
and how Russians came to my grandfather’s house and stole everything. I 
think because of these moments in history they feel the most Polish …. We’ve 
got an easier life - we can’t really understand how hard it was for these people. 
 
The notion of a cohort - meaning those born within a particular period of time, 
rather than a particular year - is a useful analytic tool with which to examine the 
different experiences and societal constructs of different age groups. The concept of 
generation was used by Fulbrook (2011) to characterize “the differential impact of the 
times people live through and the significance of the ‘social age’ at time of particular 
historical contexts and developments” (2011: 9).  Many of the young people in this 
study stress that they saw themselves as politically a different generation, and 
attributed this difference to the changed ‘social age’ and political context.  Many of 
them said that they were thinking of how they might act to safeguard their futures, 
some by participating in socio-political processes, which will be considered in the 
following section, others by taking the opportunity to migrate, permanently or 
temporarily.  They were, as Katz observed, “subjects and social actors in their own 
right” (2008:9),   
 
Power and Agency 
Running through many of these discussions about the faults of national 
society were discourses of power and powerlessness. Some of these young people felt 
dispossessed, lacking any sense of agency or ability to influence the system. For 
example, in Latvia, although Klinta (♀15) was able to say “I feel satisfied with my 
country”, she went on “we cannot change what is happening. We cannot change the 
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future of Latvia”. In Romania, there was sometimes debate about whether political 
activity was possible, as in this exchange in Bucureşti: 
Olga (♀16)  - we don’t have the power to change. We’ve tried to change the 
President and our parents to vote for someone else - but it’s still the 
same - men want power, and when they have it, they make use of it. 
Mihai (♂15)  I’m sorry, but we are the people - we have the power - we are 
democratic, so the power should be with the people.  
 
Most young people were broadly optimistic, professing faith in the future 
development of their country, sentiments sometimes tinged with expressions of 
powerlessness but mostly affirmative. Many were like Ivana (♀17) in Bulgaria, who 
suggests that emigration is a selfish solution: “if you go abroad, you will not change 
anything”. Migration was a contested issue in almost every country, and offered yet 
another lens through which to define identity connected to one’s country. Borislav 
(♂16) argued that there were two types of people: “people who want to leave, who 
don’t want to live here and think that if they go abroad they will have a better life, and 
people who are proud of being Bulgarian, who love the country and want to stay”. 
The thought of leaving a country produced in some an urge to talk about their 
attachment to the country.  
This focus on the cultural rather than the civic, coupled with the respective 
positive and negative attitudes towards each, created a quandary for those who felt 
that they possessed agency or at least that they could contribute to the control of civic 
structures and political processes (Ross 2014). Could they - or should they - attempt 
to achieve the necessary solidarity to challenge systems that they felt to be inefficient 
or even corrupt when their allegiance to the country was primarily to its cultural 
practices, rather than its civic institutions? A recent study has suggested that college 
students may be particularly sensitive to perceived violations of agency, such as 
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political corruption (Metcalfe et al 2010, 281). An exchange between a group of 16 
year olds at a school in north-eastern Poland illustrates this: 
Maria (♀) You all say that this… should be changed so we’ll be better, but are 
you able to say that in two years’ time, when you’re 18, you’ll go to 
vote? Because many young people usually don’t.  
Dominik (♂) Yes, of course. [does not sound very convinced] 
Małgorzata (♀) I can’t tell, because now I could say yes I will, but then it could turn 
out that I won’t. 
Olgierd (♂) The election itself is not the solution - what really counts is the 
willingness to change. Will you [Maria] stay here in Poland and try 
to change and make better what can be made better around us? Most 
young people will not - they’ll choose an easier way and emigrate to 
the West. It takes real effort to try to change something knowing 
that you’re alone … the willingness to change must really be ours 
and not of the one who’s going to represent us. It’s us who should 
want to change something in our country. 
 
Maria and Olgierd appear to construct themselves as potentially agentic. She 
argues that at least they should participate in elections (she thinks most young people 
will not), while he says that real agency lies in staying in Poland and participating in 
change.  Dominik’s hesitancy, and Małgorzata’s franker acknowledgment suggest that 
they, at least, feel less powerful.  Emigration was for many a very real option made 
possible by their country’s accession to the European Union in the few years before 
these discussions. The prospect of leaving, whether for the short or the long term, was 
vigorously discussed in many groups. Talking about these options required these 
young people, particularly those in their later teens, to concentrate on their 
relationship to the country in a more focused way with a greater sense of realism, than 
might otherwise have been the case.  
There was a counter-narrative of individual self-interest, exemplified by 
Monta (♀15) in Latvia, who said (after a long discussion on this issue) “well, I think 
more about myself, not about the country. If we speak honestly, I think more about 
what I am going to do, what I need, and what I want - not about what the country 
needs, what will happen to our country”. To some, this was unproblematic. In 
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Lithuania Aušra (♀15) argued “I am not only a Lithuanian, but I am also a European. 
It’s great! It’s easier to go abroad. I’m not planning to stay in Lithuania - the 
economic situation is not very good”.  This was a different sense of empowerment 
that reflects an individual, self-interested sense of being able to decide on one’s future 
– in a way that had not been possible for their parents and grandparents at the same 
stage of their lives. Mitchell (2006) has noted that the expansion of the European 
Union in 2004 could be construed as a shift from a former policy of “upward 
harmonisation” to a “discipline of neo-liberalism” (2006: 395) that encouraged the 
development of flexible and mobile workers, and the constructions put forward by 
Monta and Aušra appear to underline the extent to which some young people have 
strategically used the possibility of movement to construct a sense of individual 
agency. 
 
Conclusions  
Participating young people discussed political issues in an articulate manner 
and with a high degree of cogency. Their comments were critical and relevant to their 
personal context, but were informed with knowledge about the history and politics of 
their countries and the European Union. Participants’ views were different within 
each country and between countries. More significantly, participants asserted their 
identities in different ways depending whether they looked through the lens of their 
country or Europe.  
Bruter’s (2005) civic-cultural perspectives were evidenced in most accounts of 
participants’ identification with their country. Positive cultural empathy contrasted 
with a range of dissatisfactions with civic structures.  The strengths of their countries’ 
political values became more evident (to some of them) when they considered some 
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neighboring states.  The lens of the European Union also sometimes led to similar 
nuances. It was sometimes said that the country’s civic structures had been positively 
supported by membership, though economic support, some said, offered opportunities 
for political corruption. This critique underpins the argument that youth in this study 
were informed about politics and political values and skillfully leveled their critiques 
on these grounds. Skelton’s (2008, 2010) observations on the way that young people 
are able to construct commentaries on the social world about them are evident in the 
critical and informed remarks that they made, often focusing (as Jens 2004 noted) on 
global social themes. 
Generational differences offered another lens through which to construct one’s 
country. The events described by parents and grandparents – of the Second World 
War, of the communist period, or of the times of national independence were known 
of, but seen as part of a parental discourse that was necessary to the young people 
only to provide an other form of political engagement from which they can distance 
themselves. There was sympathy and understanding of parents and grandparents’ 
patriotism, but also an expression of being part of a modern cohort or generation that 
no longer needs loyalty to one’s country in the same form. Generally, their patriotism 
is constructed in terms of affection and gentle affinities, rather than of struggle and 
resistance. This appears to reflect Fulbrook’s (2011) concept of generational 
dissonance following key political transitions, and contrasts with the hypothesis 
advanced by Leccardi and Feixa (2012) that young people in Eastern Europe construct 
their identities largely within the collective family memories of the communist period.  
These young people’s perception of the older generations of their family appears to be 
that parents and grandparents are locked into a reaction to their experiences of those 
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times, and that the new generation that these young people belong to are able to 
dissociate themselves from these reactions.     
Accession to the European Union created a very real dilemma for many young 
people. They were now able to migrate, temporarily or permanently, to other 
European countries with relatively little restriction. They argued that doing so would 
perhaps leave their country in a liminal, non-European status, but bring them 
personally social and economic advantages. Staying in their country they reckoned, to 
which many expressed strong cultural ties, might possibly advantage the country as a 
whole. Despite the often expressed frustrations with local politics, a number of 
participants felt they should stay. The neo-liberal labor flexibility within the enlarged 
EU (Mitchell 2006) gave these young people a very real sense of agency and an 
ability – even a need – to make decisions about the directions their lives could take 
(Skelton 2010). 
This interviewed cohort of young people positioned themselves as politically 
very different to earlier generations. They are engaged with politics, sometimes 
through criticisms of local political practices, and at other times striving for political 
agency.  They have, in a very real sense, a set of choices to make about their political 
identities. Moreover, they are aware of that not only do such choices exist but they are 
approaching the age when they will be able to make decisions.   
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Table 1: number and location of informants in focus groups 
 
Country Locations (towns and cities) n 
schools 
n 
focus 
groups 
n young 
people 
Bulgaria Blagoevgrad, Sofia, Veliko Tarnovo 6 11 72 
Croatia Rijeka, Zadar, Zagreb 6 11 68 
Czech Republic  Hradec Králové, Ostrava 4 8 47 
Estonia Tallinn, Tartu, Luunja, Püünsi 4 8 44 
Hungary Budapest, Pécs, Szeged 6 10 64 
Latvia Jūrmala, Rēzekne, Riga 4 8 50 
Lithuania Elektrėnai, Kaunas, Vilnius 4 6 40 
Macedonia Prilep, Skopje, Tetovo 6 11 72 
Poland Białystok, Kraków, Olsztyn, Warszawa 9 16 96 
Romania Bucureşti, Iași, Oradea, Timișoara 10 16 105 
Slovakia Banská Bystrica, Prešov 3 7 42 
Slovenia Koper, Ljubljana, Novo Mesto, Prade 7 13 76 
Total in this analysis 
 
69 125 776 
Other countries in study not included in this analysis    
Cyprus Lapta, Larnaca, Lefkoşa, Nicosia 4 8 55 
Iceland Akureyri Reykjavík Selfoss 8 10 58 
Turkey Çanakkale Eskişehir İstanbul Tokat 15 16 85 
  27 34 198 
 
 
 
                                                 
